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 At oral argument for the foundational Second Amendment case District of 
Columbia v. Heller,1 Chief Justice John Roberts expressed skepticism at the standards 
of review, often referred to as the tiers of scrutiny, that developed over the last several 
decades. The Chief Justice stated, “Well, these various phrases under the different 
standards that are proposed…none of them appear in the Constitution.”2 Rather, he 
asked, “[i]sn’t it enough to determine the scope of the existing right that the amendment 
refers to, look at the various regulations that were available at the time…and determine... 
how this restriction and the scope of this right look in relation to those?”3 Here, Roberts 
is asking for a historical inquiry to determine what rights the Amendment protects. He 
is also asking for analogous laws, presumably in the Founding Era, that would provide 
guidance in upholding or striking down the law in question.4 It seems the Chief Justice 
thought this historical analysis might provide a more useful standard of review than 
“these standards that apply in the First Amendment [that] just kind of developed over 
the years as sort of baggage that the First Amendment picked up.”5 
 In the Heller majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, this suggestion by 
Roberts was not explicitly adopted.6 Yet, the opinion makes clear that history played a 
central role in determining there was an individual right to keep and bear arms anchored 
in the preexisting right to self-defense.7 While there are criticisms of the opinion, both 
for its methodology and conclusions,8 it is precedent nonetheless. However, the lack of 
clarity provided by the majority opinion left many scholars and lower courts to wonder 
how to apply it to other regulations invoking Second Amendment protections.  
                                                     
† Juris Doctor from the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, Masters of Public Health 
from Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health. I would like to thank the participants and attendees of the 
symposium for their helpful feedback, as well as the staff of the American Journal of Law & Medicine for 
their assistance with this article. 
1 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
2 Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290). 
3 Id. 
4 See id. 
5 Id. 
6 Nelson Lund, Second Amendment Standards of Review in a Heller World, 39 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1617, 
1619 (2012). 
7 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 603 (finding issue with Justice Stevens’ dissent relying on drafting history of the 
Second Amendment, which implies fashioning a new right rather than codifying a pre-existing right). 
8 See discussion infra Part II. 
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 After Heller and the subsequent case McDonald v. City of Chicago,9 which 
incorporated the Second Amendment protections against the states, the Supreme Court 
declined to hear any other Second Amendment case until the recent grant of certiorari 
for New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York.10 Justice Thomas 
has taken great displeasure with the repeated denials of certiorari, providing frequent 
dissents. In Justice Thomas’s opinion, the Second Amendment is a “disfavored right in 
this Court.”11 He finds this particularly troubling considering lower courts’ “general 
failure to afford the Second Amendment the respect due an enumerated constitutional 
right.”12  
Interestingly, in one of his dissents Justice Thomas echoed Chief Justice 
Roberts’s  point from the Heller oral argument. Justice Thomas noted, “the Courts of 
Appeals generally evaluate Second Amendment claims under intermediate scrutiny. 
Several jurists disagree with this approach, suggesting that courts instead ask whether 
the challenged law complies with the text, history, and tradition of the Second 
Amendment.”13 Then, in a footnote, Justice Thomas confesses that “I, too, have 
questioned this Court’s tiers-of-scrutiny jurisprudence.”14 In another dissent, Thomas 
expressed support for a Second Amendment challenge under the “relevant history . . 
.sources from England, the founding era, the antebellum period, and Reconstruction.”15 
Importantly, Justice Gorsuch joined this dissent, providing evidence of his support of a 
historical approach to laws implicating the Second Amendment.16 
 These Justices may have a new addition to their team of those who doubt 
scrutiny-based review under the Second Amendment and believe in the power of 
historical inquiry. In Heller v. District of Columbia (“Heller II”),17 then Judge 
Kavanaugh, and now Justice Kavanaugh, argued that regulations infringing on Second 
Amendment rights must be evaluated under “Heller’s history- and tradition-based 
test.”18 Judge Kavanaugh also expressed discomfort with the notion that heightened 
scrutiny, intermediate or strict, would be applied. Judge Kavanaugh declared these 
scrutiny-based review methods nothing more than “judge-empowering ‘interest-
balancing inquir[ies].’”19 In fact, Judge Kavanaugh echoed Scalia’s McDonald 
concurrence in stating “the Heller test will be more determinate and ‘much less 
subjective’ because ‘it depends upon a body of evidence susceptible of reasoned analysis 
rather than a variety of vague ethico-political First Principles whose combined 
conclusion can be found to point in any direction the judges favor.”20 Though four does 
not make a Supreme Court majority, it seems unlikely Justice Alito would be hostile to 
                                                     
9 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
10 883 F.3d 45 (2nd Cir. 2018), cert. granted,  139 S.Ct. 939 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2019) (No. 18-280). 
11 Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 945, 945 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2018) (No. 
17-342) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 947. 
14 Id. at 948 n.4. 
15 Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1995, 1998 (U.S. June 26, 
2017) (No. 16-894) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
16 Id. at 1996. 
17 670 F.3d 1244, 1295 (2011). 
18 Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1295 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
19 Id. at 1277. 
20 Id. at 1274 (quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 804 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
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a historical-based approach given that he wrote the majority opinion in McDonald using 
historical analysis to incorporate the Second Amendment right against the states.21  
 Gun violence is a public health problem that is in desperate need for a public 
health solution.22 In developing gun safety measures, a question that must be explored 
is how much history will limit states’ abilities to tackle the problem. While a public 
health approach to gun violence gains momentum,23 the use of public health case law 
may offer some insight into the role history can, and should, play in Second Amendment 
doctrine. Public health law is largely ignored in Second Amendment debates, however, 
it provides a useful framework to determine the authority of the state to limit individual 
rights for the benefit of others. The police power provides the authority to pass 
regulations to protect public health and safety,24 making it a seemingly obvious area of 
law to survey.   
Part I of this article briefly examines the use of history in Heller, in both the 
majority and dissenting opinions. This demonstrates how history is used, what it tells 
us, and, importantly, what it does not. By highlighting the disagreements over the 
historical record and the inconsistent use of historical references, this section lays the 
groundwork for understanding the difficulty in determining the role of history for 
doctrinal guidance as well as its limitations. Part II examines some of the critiques of 
relying on historical analysis, attempting to decouple the notion that the debate over the 
role of history can be reduced simply to political or legal ideology. Finally, in Part III 
the article will explore the scope of authority of the state to combat gun violence. 
Looking to foundational public health law norms, this final section aims to illustrate the 
limitations of a historical focus when evaluating Second Amendment regulations. 
Ultimately, the scope of the right, which historical analysis may be more aptly applied 
to, may not matter nearly as much as many Second Amendment scholars think when 
determining the authority of the state to respond to gun violence. Instead, case law 
related to the authority of states to utilize their police powers to limit individual rights 
in the name of public health and safety may be a more logical excavation site than the 
annals of founding era history.  
 
I. HELLER & HISTORY 
Given the peculiar structure of the Second Amendment, there was an ongoing 
question of what protections the Amendment provided and to whom. By treating these 
as essentially questions of first impression in District of Columbia v. Heller, the majority 
ensured that history had to play a central role.25 Yet, history plays an extraordinarily 
prominent role in both the majority and dissenting opinions, with each using originalist 
                                                     
21 Cf. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786 (applying analysis of Second Amendment rights in a historical and traditional 
context).  
22 See Scott R. Kegler et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Firearm Homicides and Suicides in Major 
Metropolitan Areas — United States, 2012–2013 and 2015–2016, 67(44) MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY 
REPORT 1233, 1233 (2018) (“Firearm homicides and suicides represent a continuing public health concern in 
the United States.”).  
23 See discussion infra Part III. 
24 See Lewis v. BT Inventory Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980) (“[T]he States retain authority under 
their general police powers to regulate matters of ‘legitimate local concern.’”); Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 
11, 25 (1905) (“the police power of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations 
established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.”).  
25 Part of the disagreement in Heller is over whether United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) addressed 
questions of Second Amendment protections See infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.  
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methodologies that seem identical on the surface.26 Thus, to better understand how 
history may be used in the future, it is worth examining some of the primary 
disagreements and how the justices reached such conflicting conclusions.  
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia uses history to evaluate the language of 
the amendment, in order to determine what the amendment protects as it was understood 
at the time of its passing. He utilizes sources from England,27 the Founding Era,28 post-
ratification,29 pre-civil war,30 and state analogues31 to determine the meaning of the 
operative clause, the prefatory clause, and clarify their relationship to each other.32  
Justice Scalia felt examination of historical understanding of the Amendment 
was particularly important because “Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope 
they were understood to have when the people adopted them.”33 What is less clear is 
whether the majority opinion holds this to be the only inquiry of import, and whether 
the scope of the right, as determined by historical due diligence, then defines the rigid 
boundaries of allowable state action.  
After his analysis, Justice Scalia found an individual right to possess and carry 
weapons in case of confrontation is “strongly confirmed by the historical background of 
the Second Amendment.”34 Moreover, Justice Scalia felt examination of historical 
understanding of the Amendment was particularly important given the fact that it was 
codifying a pre-existing right, “the natural right of resistance and self-preservation.”35  
Yet, Justice Scalia’s historical excavation was not the only one present in 
Heller, with Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer referencing historical resources in their 
dissents.36 Justice Stevens’ examination of the historical record was not focused on 
whether an individual right existed because “a conclusion that the Second Amendment 
protects an individual right does not tell us anything about the scope of that right.”37 
Stevens’ primary question was whether the scope included the possession and use of 
guns for nonmilitary purposes, due to the reference to militia.38  
In Justice Stevens’ opinion, the protection granted by the Amendment was “the 
right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but that it does not curtail the 
Legislature’s power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons.”39 
Unlike Justice Scalia’s finding that the Amendment protects an individual right 
grounded in the preexisting right of self-defense, Justice Stevens’ interpretation answers 
the question of whether the scope of state authority is defined as well. Under Justice 
Stevens’ interpretation, regulation of nonmilitary use and possession are well within the 
state’s authority.40  
                                                     
26 Compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 573-635 (majority opinion) with id. at 636-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and id. 
at 681-722 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
27 Id. at 578 n.3, 583-84 n.7 (citing historical sources from England). 
28 Id. at 580 n.7 (citing historical sources from the Founding Era). 
29 Id. at 607 n.20 (citing post-ratification sources). 
30 Id. at 611-12 n.21 (citing pre-civil war sources). 
31 Heller, 554 U.S. at 600-03 (discussing state analogues). 
32 Id. at 576-619 (interpreting the meaning of the operative clause and prefatory clause). 
33 Id. at 634-35.  
34 Id. at 592.  
35 Id. at 594. 
36 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 681-91 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
37 Id.  at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
38 Id. at 636-37. 
39 Id. at 637. 
40 Id. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Stevens felt this was the “most natural reading of the Amendment’s text 
and the interpretation most faithful to the history of its adoption.”41 Focusing on the 
drafting history of the Amendment, Justice Stevens found “its Framers rejected 
proposals that would have broadened its coverage,” which may have included individual 
rights to weaponry independent of military service.42 However, Justice Scalia rejects this 
focus on drafting history when interpreting the text because the Amendment “was 
widely understood to codify a pre-existing right, rather than to fashion a new one.”43  
In the debate over whether this case did indeed present questions of first 
impression, history again is critical. In distinguishing Heller from United States v. 
Miller,44 which was previously regarded as foundational to Second Amendment 
understanding, Justice Scalia notes that there was no discussion of Second Amendment 
history in Miller.45 Thus, he finds Miller unhelpful in definitively answering the key 
questions presented in Heller. Instead, Justice Scalia states Miller simply limits Second 
Amendment protections to certain types of weapons.46 When discussing what types of 
arms did garner protection, Justice Scalia reviews history and determines that the “arms 
‘in common use at the time’ for lawful purposes like self-defense” fall under Second 
Amendment protection.47 In his view, this comports with the “historical tradition of 
prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’”48  
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, disagrees with this assessment of Miller, as 
well as the Amendment’s connection to self-defense. Justice Stevens notes that history 
was discussed in Miller, and that the sources the majority relies upon in Heller were 
certainly available to the Court in Miller.49 In Justice Stevens’ estimation, the Heller 
majority “simply does not approve of the conclusion the Miller Court reached.”50 
                                                     
41 Heller, 554 U.S. at 638. Stevens’ analysis also starts with the prefatory clause, not the operative clause as 
Scalia does. Thus, Stevens believes this sets the object of the Amendment, keeping and bearing arms in the 
context of service in state militias, and informs the remaining part of the text. Id. at 643. He finds the order in 
which Scalia reads the text contradictory to how it would’ve been read at the time the Amendment was 
adopted. Id.  
42 Id.  at 639 (emphasis in original). Stevens sees the Amendment as a response to a compromise that was 
reached to address two issues during the Founding Era. There was “widespread fear that a national standing 
Army posed an intolerable threat to individual liberty and to the sovereignty of the separate States.” Id. at 653. 
Yet, “the Framers recognized the dangers inherent in relying on inadequately trained militia members ‘as the 
primary means of providing for the common defense.’” Id. Thus, Congress was authorized in the Constitution 
to raise and support a national Army and Navy, as well as organize, arm, discipline, and provide for the calling 
forth of “the Militia.” Id. at 654. According to many, this left a critical gap: the ability of Congress to disarm 
the militia, rendering them useless, while the federal government maintained their own standing forces. Id. at 
655. Thus, the Second Amendment sought to protect those state militias. Id. at 660-61. Stevens explains the 
curious absence of Second Amendment jurisprudence following these Founding Era debates by the fact that 
they simply faded relatively quickly. Id. at 671.  
43 Id. at 603 (majority opinion). 
44 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
45 Heller, 552 U.S. at 624. (“As for the text of the Court’s opinion itself, that discusses none of the history of 
the Second Amendment. It assumes from the prologue that the Amendment was designed to preserve the 
militia (which we do not dispute), and then reviews some historical materials dealing with the nature of the 
militia, and in particular with the nature of the arms their members were expected to possess. Not a word (not 
a word) about the history of the Second Amendment.”).  
46 Id. at 623.  
47 Id. at 624. 
48 Id. at 627. 
49 Id. at 676-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens explains that the government, arguing in Miller, used the 
English Bill of Rights, history leading to the English guarantee, as well as citations to Blackstone, Cooley, 
and Story. Thus, “[t]he Court is reduced to critiquing the number of pages the Government devoted to 
exploring the English legal sources.” Id. at 678. 
50 Heller, 554 U.S. at 679. 
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Stevens goes on to use an argument similar to that made by Scalia, finding there was no 
discussion in Miller regarding self-defense. Justice Stevens asks, “[i]f use for self-
defense were the standard, why did the Court not inquire into the suitability of a 
particular weapon for self-defense purposes?”51  
Finding an individual right to keep and bear arms grounded in self-defense 
likely would have been sufficient to strike down the D.C. law at issue in Heller. But this 
tells us little of the boundaries of where that right ends. Further defining the contours of 
the right, Justice Scalia felt the need to illustrate, rather than simply state, the “right 
secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”52 Again, Scalia takes us on a trip 
back in time, stating the exceptions to the right were those prohibitions that were found 
to be “longstanding.”53 These traditional limitations on Second Amendment rights 
included “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms.”54 Though a reference to any historical text or data is curiously absent, Justice 
Scalia deemed them “presumptively lawful.”55  
Justice Stevens criticizes the historical finding that the Amendment only 
protects “law-abiding, responsible citizens,”56 which Justice Scalia used to justify the 
exception noted for felons and the mentally ill. Justice Stevens emphasizes that this is a 
stark departure from other areas of constitutional analysis because throughout history 
the protections from other constitutional amendments, such as the First and Fourth, have 
applied to all citizens.57 Typically, citizens receive constitutional protection, although 
they may lose aspects of the protection under certain circumstances. Without 
justification, especially from archival documentation, Justice Scalia glosses over this 
fact in such a way that makes it difficult to understand the precedential guidance of these 
exceptions to Second Amendment protections. 
One particularly interesting point of departure from the historical record worth 
noting comes when Scalia considers the handgun ban in question. In rejecting the 
authority of the District to ban handguns, Scalia places particular importance on 
handguns being “the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the 
home.”58 Here, Justice Scalia makes no reference or citation to history, instead he 
supports his argument with justifications for why many might choose a handgun for 
defense in the home.59 In this debate, Scalia’s primary adversary is Justice Breyer. 
Justice Breyer turns to historical regulations in his dissent to argue that even if there is 
an individual right, that does not necessarily prevent the regulation in question from 
being upheld.60 Again, the dissent focuses more on the authority of the state than Justice 
Scalia does in the majority opinion. Justice Breyer attempts to analogize historical laws 
that restrict the use of firearms to determine not simply what the Amendment protects, 
but what the Amendment allows in terms of restricting the right. Yet, Justice Scalia finds 
                                                     
51 Id. at 677. 
52 Id. at 626-27 (majority opinion). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 626-27. 
55 Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26. 
56 Id. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
57 Id. at 644-45.   
58 Id. at 628-29 (majority opinion).  
59 Id.  
60 Heller, 554 U.S. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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this unpersuasive, distinguishing those laws based on their content as well as their 
punishment.61  
This brief discussion lays the groundwork for the importance of history in 
determining who the Second Amendment right belongs to (individuals), the grounding 
for that right (self-defense), and some key exceptions to that right (longstanding 
prohibitions that are presumptively lawful). However, the majority opinion largely 
ignores the scope of state authority in their discussion. Given the significance the 
historical record plays in each key determination emanating from Heller, lower courts 
were left to ascertain how to use history when evaluating state regulations that 
implicated this individual Second Amendment right. 
 
II. UNDERSTANDING HISTORICAL LIMITATIONS 
 
The battle over historical analysis was reignited in the follow-up case to Heller, 
McDonald v. Chicago,62 which determined the right was incorporated against the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Given that the standard for 
incorporation is a question of whether the right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition,” it is not surprising that historical resources would be of central 
importance.63 In holding the individual right to keep and bear arms was “fundamental to 
our scheme of ordered liberty,” the majority opinion in McDonald makes use of the 
historical inquiry in Heller in large part to come to its conclusion: “Heller makes it clear 
that this right is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”64 
But in his concurrence, Justice Scalia makes a concession: “Historical analysis 
can be difficult; it sometimes requires resolving threshold questions, and making 
nuanced judgments about which evidence to consult and how to interpret it. I will 
stipulate to that.”65 Here, Justice Scalia admits that historical investigations by the 
judiciary, presumably including those that have played such a vital part in identifying 
the individual right to firearms, require judgment calls about what resources to include 
and what to reject, as well as how to interpret those that are ultimately kept. Justice 
Scalia demonstrated a clear disdain for Justice Breyer’s suggested interest-balancing 
inquiry in Heller, calling it “judge-empowering.”66 Yet, in McDonald Justice Scalia 
admits that even in using history, judges are empowered to make determinations that 
can have a significant impact on constitutional determinations.67 This is important when 
considering another factor: judges are not historians.  
Saul Cornell, a professor of history, states that Heller is a collision of two 
competing theories of originalism: Justice Scalia’s public meaning originalism and 
                                                     
61 Id. at 633-34 (majority opinion) (“A broader point about the laws that JUSTICE BREYER cites: All of them 
punished the discharge (or loading) of guns with a small fine and forfeiture of the weapon (or in a few cases 
a very brief stay in the local jail), not with significant criminal penalties. They are akin to modern penalties 
for minor public-safety infractions…The District law, by contrast, far from imposing a minor fine, threatens 
citizens with a year in prison (five years for a second violation) for even obtaining a gun in the first place.”). 
62 561 U.S. 742 (2010).  
63 Id. at 767 (quoting Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).. 
64 Id. at 764, 768 (emphasis in original).  
65 Id. at 803-04 (Scalia, J., concurring)  
66 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634. 
67 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at  791-804 (Scalia, J., concurring) (distinguishing his historical analysis with that 
of Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Stevens’ originalism focused on the intent of the Founders.68 Yet, Cornell finds 
that “[b]oth forms of originalism employed in Heller fall short of the standards historical 
scholarship demands.”69 Judges are regularly required to delve into fields they may not 
have expertise, and this does not necessarily make their rulings inadequate, uninformed, 
or subjective. But given the growing issue of gun violence, it is essential to question the 
judiciary’s use of historical resources to determine the scope of Second Amendment 
rights and, perhaps more importantly, the scope of the state’s authority to regulate that 
right. 
To be sure, this is not simply a dispute between “conservative” and “liberal” 
legal thinkers. As Justice Stevens’ Heller dissent demonstrates, originalism has become 
a method utilized by judges regardless of the political label they are ascribed. And Judge 
Richard Posner has been particularly critical of Heller and its use of history, both in the 
majority and dissenting opinions:  
 
[I]t leaves the impression that all that divided the two wings of the Court 
was a disagreement over the historical record. … The majority (and the 
dissent as well) was engaged in what is derisively referred to—the 
derision is richly deserved—as “law office history.” … The judge sends 
his law clerks scurrying to the library and to the Web for bits and pieces 
of historical documentation. When the clerks are the numerous and able 
clerks of Supreme Court justices, enjoying the assistance of capable 
staffs of the Supreme Court library and the Library of Congress, and 
when dozens and sometimes hundreds of amicus curiae briefs have been 
filed, many bulked out with the fruits of their authors’ own law-office 
historiography, it is a simple matter, especially for a skillful rhetorician 
such as Scalia, to write a plausible historical defense of his position.70  
 
Posner’s critique brings clarity to a particularly troubling issue with this historical 
methodology. With hundreds of years of documents and texts, combined with capable 
staff and resources, a wide array of conclusions could be reached with at least some 
credibility. But, as Posner points out, the historical evidence is rarely as one-sided as a 
judicial opinion may suggest.71 The “mystique of ‘objective’ interpretation” rarely leads 
to “disinterested historical inquiry.”72 
 Here, Posner and Cornell share similar concerns. Heller contains a vast array 
of historical resources, yet, it almost certainly is not every relevant document available. 
Judges by necessity, if not preference as well, must pick and choose what documents to 
review and include in their analysis. In this way, history can become “result-oriented 
law office history.”73 Whether this perception is accurate or not, this can leave many 
with the belief that the Court “exercises a freewheeling discretion strongly flavored with 
ideology.”74 
                                                     
68 Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 
OHIO ST. L. J. 625, 625 (2008). 
69 Id. at 627.  




73 Cornell, supra note 68, at 625.  
74 Posner, supra note 70. 
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 For example, Richard Epstein criticizes the Heller majority for its passing 
reference to the Militia Clauses when determining the original meaning of the Second 
Amendment.75 In his opinion, Epstein finds it “necessary to read the Second Amendment 
in light of the Militia Clauses in the body of the Constitution.”76 Epstein’s historical 
analysis attempts to contextualize the Militia clauses to elucidate the meaning of the 
prefatory clause “well regulated Militia,” which Scalia “easily dismissed.”77 While 
Epstein comes to a different conclusion than Heller, perhaps his most insightful point is 
this:  
 
In the best of circumstances, the reliability and efficiency of ordinary language 
is dependent on a large set of tacit assumptions that make every word count in 
order to foster the efficient exchange of information. But the ability to execute 
this program is no better than the constitutional text with which the Justices 
have to work. The ideal interpretation of a flawed provision inherits its flaw. 
And few texts seem as flawed as the Second Amendment.78 
 
Whether it be the extensive historical resources or the flawed original text, it should be 
acknowledged that divining the original meaning of a textual provision written centuries 
ago is no simple task. Moreover, the ability of a judge to divine the meaning of the text 
without making decisions that align with certain underlying values is nearly impossible.  
 Therefore, how should history play a role in Second Amendment 
jurisprudence? Or, phrased another way, how does, or should, history limit the ability of 
states to combat the threat of gun violence? The theoretical too often can get separated 
from the pragmatic. The devastating impact that gun violence can have on communities, 
especially vulnerable, underserved communities should not be lost in a battle over 
interpreting 18th-century documents. With this in mind, public health law may provide 
a useful lens to help determine the role of history for the Second Amendment. 
 
III. HISTORY, POLICE POWER, AND PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSIVENESS  
 
Gun violence is increasingly recognized as a public health crisis that needs a 
public health approach.79 Due to the doctrinal ambiguity left after Heller and McDonald, 
an unanswered question is how the law, specifically regulations that may infringe on the 
Second Amendment, fits into this public health methodology. Though the justification 
for firearms regulations is nearly always public safety, if not universally so, the 
                                                     
75 See Richard A. Epstein, A Structural Interpretation of the Second Amendment: Why Heller is (Probably) 
Wrong on Originalist Grounds, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 171, 183 (2008) (“Nor does his brief structural analysis 
of the Article I provisions deal with the federalism concerns.”).  
76 Id. at 174. 
77 Id. at 177. 
78 Id. at 172. 
79 See, e.g., Colleen L. Barry et al., Public Support for Gun Violence Prevention Policies Among Gun Owners 
and Non-Gun Owners in 2017, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 878, 878 (2018) (finding support for 23 of 24 gun 
policies examined that restrict or regulate gun ownership); Renee Butkus et al., Reducing Firearm Injuries 
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INTERNAL MED. 704, 705-05 (2018) (calling gun violence a public health crisis that requires immediate 
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& Matthew Miller, Public Health Approach to the Prevention of Gun Violence, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2033, 
2033 (2013) (analogizing the public health approach to reducing motor vehicle fatalities). 
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discussion of public health and the scope of police power authority is largely absent in 
the Second Amendment debate.  
One of the central tenants of public health law is determining the appropriate 
balance between what actions the state is authorized to take in order to protect public 
health and safety, and what limitations are placed on state authority due to individual 
rights.80 The police power is “the inherent authority of the state (and, through delegation, 
local government) to enact laws and promulgate regulations to protect, preserve, and 
promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the people.”81 Thus, the 
foundation of police power authority, at least in terms of public health, is the ability of 
the state to respond to ongoing and emerging issues that place public health and safety 
at risk. This may be in stark contrast to the historical approach taken by the majority 
opinion in Heller. Indeed, some judges have insisted that Heller and McDonald only 
allow regulations that have historical analogues that closely align.82 This could place a 
significant hindrance on the ability of states and localities to utilize their police powers 
to begin a public health approach to stem the tide of rising gun violence.  
Any discussion of police power and public health law must start with the case 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts.83 Here, the Supreme Court stated as settled principle that 
“the police power of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable 
regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health 
and the public safety.”84 The Court made clear that while individual rights do limit police 
power authority, “the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every 
person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at 
all times and in all circumstances, wholly free from restraint.”85 Scalia even made this 
point in his Heller majority opinion.86 
Thus, while the Second Amendment right was declared fundamental in 
McDonald, this does not necessarily prevent state action. Indeed, regulations passed for 
public health and safety frequently infringe on fundamental rights. For example, as in 
Jacobson, compulsory vaccination concerns bodily integrity, autonomy, and the right to 
determine what medical interventions you undergo.87 Yet, the Court found the vaccine 
requirement constitutional.88 Religion, a fundamental, enumerated right, has not 
necessarily prevented police power authority. In Prince v. Massachusetts,89 the Supreme 
Court held “the right to practice religion freely does not include the liberty to expose the 
community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”90 
As the Court saw it in Jacobson, this was not simply a matter of 
constitutionality, but foundational to functioning societies. The Court believed there 
were “manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common 
                                                     
80 LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 4-5 (2008). 
81 Id. at 92. 
82 See, e.g., Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1295 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (applying history- and tradition-based test 
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83 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
84 Id. at 25. 
85 Id. at 26. 
86 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
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88 Id. at 31. 
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good,” otherwise “organized society could not exist with safety to its members.”91 
Echoing social contract theory, the Court here maintains that sacrificing individual 
liberty to some extent, or in certain circumstances, is required for our democracy to 
flourish.92 Some scholars have argued this requirement is the reason the government is 
not only authorized to act in the name of public health and safety, but in fact obligated 
to do so.93 Because a government is only legitimate if it provides security for the 
common good.94 Additionally, and importantly, protecting public health and safety 
would not be possible without some government intrusion into individual rights and 
private action.95 
Therefore, it would be legitimate for the citizenry of a state to call upon its 
elected representatives to enact legislation to address gun violence if it were a problem 
in their community. Limiting their means to address the issue to what analogues were 
available in the 18th-century seems problematic, in both law and policy. It also appears 
to contradict the way the Court has assessed the police power, an inherent authority, in 
the past. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly found the police power confers “broad 
discretion required for the protection of the public health,”96 but there are certainly 
limitations beyond individual rights that can prevent arbitrary state action. In Jacobson, 
the Court states that rights are subject to “reasonable conditions as may be deemed by 
the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order 
and morals of the community.”97 Thus, the government action must be reasonable and 
actually have some connection to health and safety by responding to a public health 
problem. In Jacobson, the Court found it critical that the state only mandated vaccination 
when smallpox was prevalent in the community and increasing in incidence, meaning 
the mandate was “necessary for the public health or the public safety.”98  
This means there must be some public health or safety threat that the state is in 
fact responding to. The Court would have been unlikely to uphold the mandate were 
there no threat of smallpox.99 This prevents arbitrary action that is untethered to risk 
mitigation, such as where the government merely uses the concept of public health and 
safety for coercive, but unnecessary, measures.100 The growing gun violence crisis 
would likely prevent state action from seeming arbitrary. 
The state action must also have a reasonable chance to mitigate the public 
health threat or risk to safety. The Jacobson Court, though limited by the medical and 
scientific information available in 1905, made a point of evaluating the measure to the 
best of their ability. If vaccinations could not reasonably be expected to prevent the 
spread of smallpox, the Court would have struck down the requirement.101 But the Court 
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Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1151-77 (1987). 
94 See id. at 270. 
95 GOSTIN, supra note 80, at 10.  
96 Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 177 (1922). 
97 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26. 
98 Id. at 27. 
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found vaccinations to be the “method most usually employed to eradicate the disease,” 
and accepted by “most members of the medical profession.”102 If the state action “has 
no real or substantial relation” to public health and safety, there is a “plain, palpable 
invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, [and] it is the duty of the courts to so 
adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.”103 Here, the question would be 
whether the state action had a reasonable chance to mitigate or prevent the growth of 
gun violence. This differs significantly from examining whether there was a historical 
analogue that deemed the regulation constitutional. 
Finally, the steps taken by the state to mitigate a public health or safety issue 
must generate benefits that justify the burdens placed upon the rights in question.104 The 
regulations cannot be “beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the 
public.”105 For example, in Jacobson, while a smallpox vaccination mandate was 
constitutional generally, it would have been unreasonable and overly burdensome, and 
therefore unconstitutional, for it to be mandated against someone with medical 
contraindications.  
An additional protective layer, is that the initial burden of proof lies with the 
state. The state must demonstrate that there is a public health or safety issue that its 
regulation has a reasonable chance to mitigate, and that the expected benefits outweigh 
the burdens on constitutional rights.106 But if the state meets this burden, it is the 
individual’s obligation to prove why the regulation should be struck down or is at least 
inapplicable to .107him. In Jacobson, the Court was critical of the plaintiff’s refusal to 
cooperate with the immunization mandate because the plaintiff offered little evidence 
that it placed him at risk and only offered his opinion on his lack of faith in vaccinations 
as justification for an exemption.108  
In thinking about gun violence and the role of history, the Court in Jacobson 
envisions police power authority as one that enables responsiveness to current crises. It 
seems readily apparent that Jacobson stands for the notion that the scope of an individual 
right, as defined by historical understanding at the time of ratification, simply cannot be 
the end of an evaluation of gun control measures. The current state of gun violence, as 
well as firearm and ammunition technological advancements, must be relevant to a 
constitutional analysis of firearm regulations. The scope of police powers cannot, and 
should not, be relegated to the interpretation of historical records from centuries ago 
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when firearms, ammunition, and population density were drastically different than they 
are today.109 
Thus, this discussion raises the question of how much history does and should 
matter? Not necessarily in terms of determining the scope of Second Amendment rights, 
but in determining what regulations the state is authorized to pass that infringe on such 
a right. For example, suppose the Second Amendment does protect a right of self-
defense generally, which would presumably confer a right to keep and bear arms outside 
of the home. Can this truly be the end of an analysis as to whether a city riddled with 
gun violence is authorized to limit, in some reasonable manner, the ability of individuals 
to carry firearms wherever they so choose?  
The principles of federalism, in concert with the inherent police power, enable 
duly elected officials in states and localities to be responsive to the public health 
concerns of their citizens.110 If the Second Amendment is ultimately going to be held to 
protect semiautomatic rifles, hollow point bullets that explode upon impact, large-
capacity ammunition magazines, and the right to arm yourself in any place that was not 
listed in the Heller majority opinion, it is going to be extremely difficult for any state to 
address issues of gun violence. That these protections may arise from a subjective 
interpretation of centuries-old documents, while firearms are becoming increasingly 
lethal,111 should be troubling to legal scholars, policymakers, and citizens alike.  
Using a public health lens to address gun violence should expand from the 
medical community and policymakers to include the legal academy as well.  A careful 
examination into the police power in public health law limits the merits of any Second 
Amendment discussion that focuses solely, or perhaps even primarily, on history. While 
history may play a role in Second Amendment jurisprudence given the centrality of its 
role in the Heller opinions, it cannot determine the full scope of police power authority 
to address gun violence. As Justice Breyer states in his Heller dissent, “[t]he historical 
evidence demonstrates that a self-defense assumption is the beginning, rather than the 
end, of any constitutional inquiry.”112 While it may not seem prudent to find guidance 
in a dissent, many of the lower courts have coalesced around a standard that ties closely 
to Justice Breyer’s statement.113 Though public health and police power jurisprudence 
are rarely discussed as justification, they clearly provide doctrinal support for eschewing 





Heller lays out a foundation for establishing an individual constitutional right 
to firearms. But, by the majority opinion’s own admission, it did not seek to establish 
the full scope of the right or the full range of regulatory options available to states to 
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infringe on that right. Many courts that aim to follow Heller’s precedent admit it lacks 
clarity and provides little guidance for future determinations. Thus, it seems essential to 
recognize and, in essence minimize, what it does in fact state. Ultimately, Heller should 
be the beginning of Second Amendment doctrine, but not the end. So too, history, the 
prominent player in Heller, should remain as the beginning of the inquiry rather than the 
end.  
As gun violence is increasingly recognized as a public health problem, public 
health law should be an increasingly examined area to find the boundaries of state 
authority. It may even prove a more useful mechanism than searches through documents 
from hundreds of years ago. Limiting Second Amendment doctrinal development to 
historical analogues has drastic consequences not only for constitutional theory, but for 
the health and wellbeing of communities across the country. 
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